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Abstract
Conceived as an idea to push financing toward underdeveloped clean energy 
technology to improve the environment, promote economic growth, and produce 
a more secure energy supply, the Title XVII loan guarantee program has likely 
failed to meet these objectives. Instead, it has been used as a political tool, exposed 
taxpayers to unnecessary risk, diverted funding from alternative clean energy 
investments, and primarily benefitted large, politically connected corporations.
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1. Introduction
Conceived as an idea to push financing towards underdeveloped clean energy 
technology to improve the environment, promote economic growth, and pro-
duce a more secure energy supply [1] the Title XVII loan guarantee program 
has likely failed to meet these objectives. Instead, it has been used as a political 
tool, exposed taxpayers to unnecessary risk, diverted funding from alternative 
clean energy investments, and primarily benefitted large, politically connected 
corporations.
The loan guarantee programs supported under Title XVII in general aim to pro-
vide financing to projects that would otherwise be unable to secure funding in the 
private market. When governments initiate loan guarantee programs, they gener-
ally target fledgling companies or struggling industries. In contrast, the Department 
of Energy program targets specific technologies irrespective of the company invest-
ing in them. The Loan Programs Office (LPO) offers loan guarantees under author-
ity granted in Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and expanded in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Loan guarantees are currently 
available only under Section 1703, which funds high-risk clean energy technology. 
While the LPO still oversees loan guarantees made under the Section 1705 program 
(of Solyndra fame), that program that expired in 2011 [2]. The latter program was 
more expansive and thus makes up the lion’s share of the LPO’s portfolio [3]. The 
LPO presides over a third program financing advanced vehicle technology, but that 
program utilizes direct loans rather than loan guarantees and will not be discussed 
in this testimony.
Government loan guarantee programs present a number of policy difficul-
ties and the Department of Energy’s program is no exception. I explore how the 
Department’s loan guarantee program distorts markets, misdirects funds, and fails 
to promote truly innovative technology.
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2. Loan guarantee programs in general
Loan guarantee programs, offered both by governments and the private sector, 
are intended to close a fiduciary gap between burgeoning ideas and private invest-
ment. By promising to cover loan payments if a company fails, loan guarantors 
allow entrepreneurs easier access to private capital. Progenitors of government pro-
grams argue that private capital is too risk averse to properly finance whatever it is 
they seek to subsidize. Credit guarantees in private agreements are used to mitigate 
risks when individuals are considering investments, but the lender is unsure of the 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan [4].
Not all cases in which “promising” technology fails to secure private financing 
can be considered justification for government intervention. The inability of high-
risk projects to get private backing is a feature of a free market system, not a bug. 
The free market is generally good at making strategic, risk-conscious investments. 
Evidence from the Richmond Federal Reserve Bank indicates that loan guarantees 
indeed attract riskier investments and encourage entrepreneurs to overinvest [5]. 
This is a classic moral hazard problem; when the costs of risks are removed without 
a corroborating reduction in reward, entrepreneurs will take risks more flagrantly 
[6]. The burden of proof lies with those who claim that private financiers are indeed 
failing particular markets. Even then, as the aforementioned Richmond Federal 
Reserve study concluded, grants, direct loans, or other public financing options 
might be superior.
Some economists do argue that adverse selection among lenders, lender appre-
hension about particular technologies, industries, or geographical areas, or the exis-
tence of a credit crunch can all offer theoretical justification for loan guarantees. 
Loan guarantee programs, offered both by governments and the private sector, are 
intended to close a fiduciary gap between burgeoning ideas and private investment. 
By promising to cover loan payments if a company fails, loan guarantors allow 
entrepreneurs easier access to private capital. Progenitors of government programs 
argue that private capital is too risk averse to properly finance whatever it is they 
seek to subsidize. Credit guarantees in private agreements are used to mitigate risks 
when individuals are considering investments, but the lender is unsure of the bor-
rower’s ability to repay the loan [4].
Not all cases in which “promising” technology fails to secure private financing 
can be considered justification for government intervention. The inability of high-
risk projects to get private backing is a feature of a free market system, not a bug. 
The free market is generally good at making strategic, risk-conscious investments. 
Evidence from the Richmond Federal Reserve Bank indicates that loan guarantees 
indeed attract riskier investments and encourage entrepreneurs to overinvest [5]. 
This is a classic moral hazard problem; when the costs of risks are removed without 
a corroborating reduction in reward, entrepreneurs will take risks more flagrantly 
[6]. The burden of proof lies with those who claim that private financiers are indeed 
failing particular markets. Even then, as the aforementioned Richmond Federal 
Reserve study concluded, grants, direct loans, or other public financing options 
might be superior.
Some economists do argue that adverse selection among lenders, lender appre-
hension about particular technologies, industries, or geographical areas, or the exis-
tence of a credit crunch can all offer theoretical justification for loan guarantees.
Still others attest that clean energy technologies ought to be subsidized by 
the government because they provide social benefits in excess of what can be 
returned to lenders, prompting private markets to underinvest. While clean 
energy technology does not create any positive externalities per se, it does crowd 
out carbon-emitting sources of energy and therefore may counteract a negative 
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externality. Of course, there are more direct and efficient ways of targeting the 
carbon problem, but subsidizing clean energy is often taken as a politically viable 
next best alternative [4].
3. History and background
If there is one reason to be skeptical of loan guarantee programs in general, it is 
the paucity of conclusive academic research on their effectiveness. In my review of 
the academic literature it became glaringly obvious that there is still much impor-
tant research to be performed on the questions of the loan guarantee program’s 
effects, its costs and benefits, and best program design [7–13]. Data that is exact 
enough to make meaningful conclusions is difficult to collect. Studies are often 
too specific, meaning they examine one particular program and may not provide 
generalizable results, or too broad to have enough data to employ proper statistical 
analyses. This problem is further compounded by the many types of loan guarantee 
programs. Some provide funding for businesses to start-up, others guarantee busi-
ness expansions, and in the program in question today, encourage the use of certain 
technologies.
As illustrative examples, here is what preliminary economics research has said 
about some international forays into loan guarantees. A French program target-
ing new firms was said to have no impact on the total number of companies, to 
increase their average size, and significantly increase their risk of default [14]. 
An investigation into a Malaysian small and medium sized enterprise program 
claims “there is sufficient evidence that the Scheme has failed to meet all [its] 
objectives” [15].
4. Policy issues in the loan guarantee program
The loan guarantee program is well-intentioned, as most policy is, but its design-
ers failed to fully consider many unseen effects. The US Department of Energy’s 
program has deterred investment in other areas and made it more difficult for some 
to receive private investments, been used as a political tool, encouraged malinvest-
ment, and primarily benefitted established companies with plenty of preexisting 
access to capital for research and development.
One key insight from policy analysis is that we must measure what matters. In 
the case of loan guarantee programs, simply because the program expands entre-
preneurs’ access to credit does not make the program a success. There are other 
important aspects that must be considered. Government action is not justified 
merely because there is a market failure. Government ought to act to fix market fail-
ures only when the net gains from resolving those problems, given the possibility of 
government failure, are positive. As Professor and governor of the Central Bank of 
Ireland Patrick Honohan writes, “With many competing pressures for public funds, 
an economically coherent argument in favor of a subsidized credit guarantee system 
needs to go a lot further than the observation that such a scheme would increase 
availability of credit” [4].
Federal loan guarantees can only be said to serve a public benefit if they accom-
plish what economists call additionality, meaning the program must be offering 
loans to projects that would not have otherwise garnered funding in the open 
market. A program that extends government assistance to projects and companies 
that would have no trouble securing private financing accomplishes little, adds 
unnecessary administrative costs, and puts taxpayer money at risk.
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Some exploratory research on the additionality of loan guarantee programs for 
energy technology from both the DOE and USDA reveals poor additionality [16]. 
The early evidence suggests few loans are extended that would not otherwise be 
attained. Given the size and robust access to financing of many companies seeking 
Title XVII funding, which I will discuss momentarily, poor additionality should 
come as no surprise.
Even if government loans managed to accomplish perfect additionality, this 
alone would not be sufficient justification for the continuation of a program. Many 
conceive of loan guarantee programs as marginally shifting the risk calculus for 
private investment. In other words, guarantees allow projects that would previously 
have been considered barely too risky to finance to get funding. Realistically, loan 
guarantees completely shift the entire calculation of private investors. Securing a 
government loan guarantee proves to be a highly political process. Private capital 
often follows public capital. Despite that statement’s appealing tenor, this is not a 
positive outcome. It means only the politically connected are funded and the extent 
of that problem is compounded beyond the bare dollar value of the government 
program.
The source of problems with government support for particular energy sources 
is that corporations and interest groups subvert the program to serve their private 
interests. Funding is allocated by political processes instead of the free choice of 
individuals who judge it to be a worthwhile investment. The fundamental problem 
at the heart of the Solyndra scandal, for example, was not that the business failed 
after securing a loan guarantee. After all, some failure will arise out of any loan 
guarantee program. Rather, the evidence that emerged following that failure dem-
onstrated that Solyndra’s path to securing a government loan guarantee had been 
dictated by political pressure, not market viability. As documented in a chapter of 
Nature Unbound, Solyndra’s application rushed through or even skipped critical 
oversight steps in order to reach approval before a California trip President Obama 
had planned. Even when failure was imminent, personnel at the Department of 
Energy urged even more funding to be pumped into Solyndra in an attempt to save 
face, despite warning from the OMB [17].
The 2015 Inspector General’s report on Solyndra confirmed that “the 
Department missed opportunities to detect and resolve indicators that por-
tions of the data provided by Solyndra were unreliable” and that employees “felt 
tremendous pressure, in general, to process loan guarantee applications […] 
based on the significant interest in the program from Department leadership, the 
Administration, Congress, and the applicants” [18]. Solyndra shed light on this 
malfeasance, but political interference is a structural problem with loan guarantee 
programs, not merely the fault of a single public officer, agency, or administration.
One point that is too often underemphasized is that this argument against 
government interference applies equally to subsidizing fossil fuels. When President 
Carter’s administration pushed for energy independence it meant government 
support for coal companies along with the research funding for and promotion of 
renewables [19, 20]. These are at least equally problematic, and considering their 
size, perhaps even more so.
Most Section 1705 funding has gone to large corporations who already have 
access to capital for investments in research, development, and deployment. 
Recipients of LPO guarantees include multiple Fortune 200 companies, utility 
companies, and multinationals. Many are wholly owned by yet larger companies 
[21]. The application process itself all but ensures that only large, established 
companies will be capable of participating in the program. Applicants can expect to 
pay between $150,000 and $400,000 in fees before even being considered [22].
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The full ramifications of supporting mainly large corporations are rarely 
understood. It does not simply mean that large corporations make risky invest-
ments and leave taxpayers to pick up the tab, but the fundamental problem is 
that it makes it more difficult for new ideas to emerge since it further entrenches 
established ideas. Research on new energy technology has stalled at least in part 
because of government’s involvement. Government support, as a previous chief 
marketing officer at Tesla Motors complained, may make it easier for those who 
receive support, but it also makes it more difficult for new ideas to gain private 
funding and grow [23].
Loan guarantee programs, like any subsidy, move resources towards the sub-
sidized good. A subsidy redirects private capital towards the subsidy because it 
lowers the risk and changes the risk calculation investors go through. In general, 
the subsidized industries see growth and investment. The unsubsidized, however, 
see lower investment. The subsidy distorts the market signals of profit and loss to 
appear as if the subsidized industries provide more value than they do.
The net result of loan guarantee programs is likely a loss in meaningful innova-
tion. This is the fundamental problem with loan guarantees. Even if the addition-
ality was 100 percent, the program employs poor methodology to pick those to 
subsidize. Political power and lobbying prowess, not the collective intelligence of 
all individuals in the market, allocate the funding of these programs. My analysis 
indicates that the unseen costs are much greater than anticipated. To some extent 
this position rests on a counterfactual--how do you measure what did not happen? 
The question of what could have been, the opportunity cost of these loans, is a seri-
ous consideration even if it is a difficult empirical one.
5. Conclusions
Preliminary examinations on the Department of Energy and USDA’s programs 
have been discouraging, though the entire literature pleads for more concerted 
research efforts. The political problems associated with the funding justify further 
skepticism towards Section 1705 and Section 1703, as do the characteristics of their 
recipients.
The primary take away from my analysis is that government’s attempt to pro-
mote innovation has likely done exactly the opposite. In place of these programs 
government would do better to simply step out of the way of entrepreneurs and 
individuals. As the development of the technology industry demonstrates, allowing 
experimentation and markets to drive innovation is a promising avenue for improv-
ing the world. In contrast to policymakers propensity to want to plan for every 
contingency, permissionless innovation, an idea developed by the Adam Thierer, 
is more likely to provide the new ideas needed to solve energy and environmental 
issues [24]. It calls for government officials to clear a path for entrepreneurial 
experimentation unfettered by precautionary regulation.
A policy of permissionless innovation is more likely to find successful solutions 
to the pressing environmental and energy questions, such as the potential dangers 
from climate change and the health issues caused by pollution, than government 
bureaucrats choosing projects to fund based on political considerations.
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